Political competition and the limits of political compromise by Cunha, Alexandre B. & Ornelas, Emanuel
ISSN 2042-2695 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1263 
March 2014 
Political Competition and the Limits of Political 
Compromise 
Alexandre B. Cunha and Emanuel Ornelas 
Abstract 
We consider an economy where competing political parties alternate in office. Due to rent-seeking 
motives, incumbents have an incentive to set public expenditures above the socially optimum level. 
Parties cannot commit to future policies, but they can forge a political compromise where each party 
curbs excessive spending when in office if they expect future governments to do the same. We find 
that, if the government cannot manipulate state variables, more intense political competition fosters a 
compromise that yields better outcomes, potentially even the first best. By contrast, if the government 
can issue debt, vigorous political competition can render a compromise unsustainable and drive the 
economy to a low-welfare, high-debt, long-run trap. Our analysis thus suggests a legislative trade-off 
between restricting political competition and constraining the ability of governments to issue debt. 
Key words: Political turnover, efficient policies, public debt 
JEL: E61, E62, H30, H63 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Macro Programme. The Centre for Economic 
Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. 
Acknowledgements 
We thank Tiago Cavalcanti, Allan Drazen, Delﬁm Gomes, Jon Fiva, B. Ravikumar and participants of 
several conferences and seminars for their helpful comments. Cunha acknowledges ﬁnancial support 
from the Brazilian Council of Science and Technology (CNPq). Ornelas acknowledges ﬁnancial 
support from the LSE Santander Travel Fund. 
Alexandre Cunha is a Professor of Economics at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. 
Emanuel Ornelas is a Reader in the Department of Management and an Associate of the Centre for 
Economic Performance, LSE. 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor 
be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it is published. 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the 
editor at the above address. 
 A.B. Cunha and E. Ornelas, submitted 2014. 
1 Introduction
There is a broad agreement among economists that competition generally improves eco-
nomic outcomes. Does that conclusion extend to political competition? Market and
political competition are fundamentally diﬀerent in that the latter aﬀects economic out-
comes indirectly, through policymaking. Still, a common presumption–as articulated
for example byWittman (1989)–is that it acts like market competition when it comes to
fostering social welfare. In a nutshell, the idea is that elections allow voters to discipline
bad governments and that competition among politicians let voters ﬁnd alternatives
to unskilled/selﬁsh incumbents. Yet while such discipline and selection eﬀects can be
stronger when political competition is ﬁercer, they may still be insuﬃcient to deliver
eﬃcient policies. For example, politicians may be inherently rent-seeking (so selection
is a non-issue) and elections may be fought on multiple dimensions that include non-
economic issues (so voting may fail to discipline incumbents’ economic policies).
We show that political competition matters for economic outcomes even when all
political parties are identical and economic policies have no eﬀect on electoral prospects,
and whether it helps or hinders economic performance hinges on the ability of incum-
bents to inﬂuence the policy space available to future governments. If incumbents can-
not aﬀect state variables like the public debt, intense political competition facilitates
the implementation of eﬃcient policies. But if governments can use the debt to ﬁnance
current government expenditures, then too much political competition leaves the econ-
omy trapped in a bad equilibrium. In particular, in a bipartisan society where political
economy frictions are serious, the eﬃcient policy is most likely to be sustainable if gov-
ernment access to the public debt is left unrestricted. More generally, our mechanism
uncovers a legislative tradeoﬀ for the sustainability of “good” economic policies. If the
laws regulating the formation of political parties are loose, then constraints on the public
debt must be tight. But if the restrictions on formal political participation are stringent,
then the government should be left free to issue debt.1
The key mechanism rests on the possibility that the political parties may cooperate
intertemporally and establish a “political compromise” to neutralize the policy ineﬃcien-
cies that stem from political frictions. The parties have an incentive to do so because
policies aﬀect their payoﬀs also when they are out of oﬃce. In that case they do not
enjoy the perks and rents created by the policies, but bear the consequences of the in-
eﬃciencies they introduce in the economy. Thus, a political compromise puts a brake
on the gains of the current incumbent but can improve its future payoﬀ. Whether it is
sustainable depends on the degree of political competition as well as on the constraints
1In the literature, the terms political competition, political instability, political turnover and political
fragmentation are often used interchangeably to denote phenomena related to situations when the
identity of those who hold power changes over time. For our purposes, we believe that ‘political
competition’ is more adequate, but occasionally we also use the near-synonyms mentioned above.
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on the public debt.
We embed the analysis in a simple, standard, neoclassical economic structure. In
each period households decide how much to work and consume, while competitive ﬁrms
decide how much to produce under a constant returns to scale technology that uses
labor as input. The government provides a public good that is ﬁnanced through taxes.
The political structure is perhaps the simplest that allows us to study our main ques-
tion. There is an exogenous number of competing parties that are unable to commit to
policies. The political friction stems from incumbents and opposition parties having dif-
ferent preferences. Speciﬁcally, the period payoﬀ of opposition parties is proportional to
the representative household period utility, whereas incumbents enjoy some extra utility
from government consumption. This results in incumbents having quasi-hyperbolic pref-
erences, as deﬁned by Laibson (1997), with the implication that the party in power has
an incentive to spend more than is socially optimal.2 Political turnover is determined
by a random process in which the probability that a given party will hold power in each
period is inversely related to the degree of political competition, proxied by the number
of active political parties.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which an incumbent is unable to manipulate the action
space of future governments. The eﬃcient policy (i.e. the one that maximizes society’s
welfare) is unachievable if politicians are too proﬂigate, as in that case the short-run
temptation to spend is too large. Otherwise, a political compromise where all parties
implement the eﬃcient policy when in power is sustainable through trigger strategies,
provided that there is enough political competition. The intuition is simple. With
strong competition, the probability that the incumbent will return to power and enjoy
oﬃce rents in the future is low, while the probability that it will suﬀer the economic
consequences of government rent-seeking when out of power is high. Hence, it pays to
forge a compromise that limits rents (and improves the economy’s performance) when
competition is ﬁerce. This is not advantageous, however, if political competition is weak
so that each party expects to hold oﬃce frequently.
In reality, incumbents will prefer a compromise that implements not the ﬁrst best,
but a policy that maximizes their own present value payoﬀs. A political compromise
that yields this “politically optimal” policy is always achievable when public debt is
ruled out, but its nature depends on the intensity of party competition. In particular,
the politically optimal policy yields higher welfare, and generates greater gains for the
parties, the more intense political competition is. Hence, in this restricted setting there
is a clear sense in which more political competition is conducive of economic eﬃciency.
Suppose now that the government can issue public debt and, as a consequence,
2Such preferences imply that, in period t, the marginal rate of substitution between t and t + 1 is
lower than the marginal rate of substitution between t+s and t+s+1, s ≥ 1. Government preferences
with this property are common in recent political economy models (e.g. Aguiar and Amador 2011,
Halac and Yared 2013).
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shape the action space of future administrations. The intuitive results just described are
then largely overturned. We concentrate on the more interesting case where politicians’
prodigality is high enough so that there is a bad equilibrium in which the ﬁrst incumbent
increases government expenditures so much that the public debt reaches its maximum
sustainable value. This would lock the society in a permanent state of low consumption
and high debt. Under the shadow of this bad equilibrium, the incentive for the political
parties to cooperate is greater. Considering trigger strategies to support better equi-
librium outcomes, we ﬁnd that the eﬃcient policy can be sustained as an equilibrium
outcome if political competition is not too intense. Similarly, the politically optimal
policy is achievable if the degree of political competition is suﬃciently low. Moreover,
the incumbent’s gain from implementing the politically optimal policy decreases with
the intensity of political competition. Therefore, curbing politicians’ proﬂigacy requires
weak, not strong political competition.
The intuition for these results is as follows. Without cooperation, an incumbent
would enjoy extraordinarily high rents in oﬃce, but would leave the economy stuck in
such a bad equilibrium that future governments would have little beneﬁt from holding
oﬃce. If instead a political compromise were forged, the incumbent would enjoy fewer
rents today but more rents in the future, if it returned to power. A political compromise
therefore not only secures a healthier state for the economy; it also preserves some rents
for future governments. But those gains from future incumbency are more relevant to
political parties when they are more likely to hold power in the future, which happens
when political competition is less intense. Therefore, contrary to conventional wisdom,
in this case political competition hampers the viability of eﬃcient policies.
These polar cases of no debt and unconstrained debt provide the insights that help us
understand the general case. A constraint on the debt lowers the incumbent’s short-run
gain in the absence of cooperation and aﬀects the future payoﬀ gain for households from
a political compromise, but neither of these eﬀects depends on the degree of political
competition. Conversely, a constraint on the debt also lowers the rents beneﬁt for future
governments due to a political compromise, and this eﬀect is stronger when competi-
tion is weak (when future rents matter more). It follows that, when electoral and other
legislative rules are such that few parties participate in the political process, tight con-
straints on the public debt undermine the feasibility of a political compromise. If instead
the laws are such that numerous political parties actively compete, strong limits on debt
issuing tend to foster a compromise. The upshot is that the desirability of tight ﬁscal
rules is inversely related to the stringency of the rules allowing political participation. A
caveat is that, when political economy frictions are suﬃciently severe, the eﬃcient policy
is unfeasible with tight constraints on the debt even under extreme levels of political
competition; still, it may be sustainable under limited political competition and with
unrestricted government access to the debt.
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1.1 Related literature
The impact of political institutions on economic performance has been the focus of a large
literature.3 Yet to date the relationship between the intensity of political competition,
debt constraints and economic outcomes has received relatively little attention. Our
analysis nevertheless relates to several lines of research.
The reason why a political compromise is useful in our model is closely related to the
rationale developed by Alesina (1988) in an early analysis of how cooperation between
(two) political parties that are unable to commit to policies can improve economic out-
comes.4 As Alesina elegantly demonstrates, while a party that follows his individually
optimal policies when in power obtains a short-run gain, if both parties behave in that
way economic performance suﬀers; with cooperation across the political spectrum, a
better outcome for both parties may be achievable.5 Alesina’s environment and focus
is however quite diﬀerent from ours. For example, in his setting political parties have
diﬀerent preferences but their payoﬀs do not depend on whether they hold oﬃce or not.
Alesina (1988) does not study situations where the incumbent’s policy aﬀects the feasible
actions of its successors either. Most importantly, in his model the intensity of political
competition is ﬁxed, and therefore it says nothing about the eﬀects of diﬀerent levels of
political competition on the feasibility of political compromise, which is our main focus.6
Our analysis in the environment without public debt is closest to the recent study of
Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2011a). In their setting, political groups alternate in
oﬃce according to an exogenous probabilistic process. When in oﬃce, each group has an
incentive to increase its own welfare at the expense of others not in power. In their setup,
the incumbent allocates consumption across groups, and would like to increase its own
consumption level. In our setup, the incumbent deﬁnes the level of public expenditures,
and would like to increase it beyond what is eﬃcient from society’s point of view. The
essence of the problem is nevertheless the same: the incumbent has the power to make
decisions that would help itself at the expense of the rest of the society. Acemoglu
et al. (2011a) then study how the degree of power persistence aﬀects the possibility
3See for example the comprehensive reviews of Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
4Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2011b) study instead an inﬁnitely repeated game between a self-
interested politician who holds power and consumers. They show that society may be able to discipline
the politician and induce him to implement the optimal taxation policy in the long run despite his self-
interest. This is possible, however, only if the politician discounts the future as consumers do. Barro
(1973) provides early insights on the limits and the workings of voters’ control of politicians.
5Dixit, Grossman and Gul (2000) extend Alesina’s (1988) logic to a situation where the political
environment evolves stochastically. As a result, the nature of the political compromise between the two
parties changes overtime, depending on the electoral strength of the party in oﬃce.
6A diﬀerent type of political compromise may arise when power is split. We abstract from such issues
here, but see Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) for a seminal analysis of the quality of policymaking
when the executive and legislative branches share power.
4
of cooperation among the political groups. Their main ﬁnding is that greater turnover
helps to reduce political economy distortions and to sustain eﬃcient outcomes. A similar
result arises here when public debt is ruled out. Acemoglu et al. do not study, however,
situations where current policy aﬀects the set of actions of future governments, which
as discussed above eﬀectively reverses our initial results.
The idea that incumbents manipulate the public debt to inﬂuence the policies of
their successors has of course been studied extensively since the seminal contributions of
Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990).7 Our goal is, however,
not to explain the dynamics of the public debt. Instead, we build on the insight from that
literature to study how the availability of debt shapes the impact of political competition
on the feasibility of a welfare-improving political compromise. The key insight we provide
is that the public debt can discipline both current and future governments provided that
there is some, but not too much, political competition.
Caballero and Yared (2010) study how political economy frictions aﬀect the level of
public debt, in an environment with both political turnover and economic volatility. As
in this paper, their goal is to study whether rent-seeking politicians spend too much or
too little relative to a benevolent social planner. They ﬁnd that rent-seeking motivations
lead to excessive spending when there is high political uncertainty relative to economic
uncertainty. If the probability of keeping power is very low, it is optimal to enjoy high
rents today and leave the bill for the next government. Yet a rent-seeking incumbent
will tend to underspend relative to the social planner during a boom when economic
uncertainty is high relative to political uncertainty. The intuition is that an incumbent
who has a high probability of keeping power will save during a boom to allow himself
higher rents in the future, when the economy is likely to weaken. This result relates to our
ﬁnding in the debt economy that weak political competition allows for the sustainability
of good economic policies because political parties want to preserve their future rents
if they return to power.8 However, the mechanisms here and in Caballero and Yared
7Battaglini (2013) departs from those canonical models by extending the analysis to a two-party
inﬁnite horizon problem and by explicitly modeling elections. Thus manipulation of public debt by one
party aﬀects not only the policy space available to future governments but also electoral probabilities.
From a diﬀerent but insightful angle, Callander and Hummel (2013) emphasize that state variables are
not necessary to create intertemporal policy linkages. Linkages can arise also if information about the
actual outcomes of a policy is incomplete. Once the party in power decides the initial level of the policy
variable, society learns the mapping between policy and outcome at that initial level. Because there
is a correlation between policies and outcomes at diﬀerent levels, the incumbent sometimes engages in
preemptive policy experimentation, i.e. uses policy today to aﬀect the policy decision of its successor by
manipulating the availability of public information in the policy-outcome space. Bierbrauer and Boyer
(2013) also study the relationship between political competition and welfare, but focus on the mode of
political competition. Fiva and Natvik (2013) ﬁnd that strategic manipulation of state variables due to
political turnover is not exclusive to public debt, extending also to investment in physical capital.
8This eﬀect also resembles a force stressed by Azzimonti (2011) when studying how polarization and
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(2010) are rather diﬀerent. They focus on the transitional period toward the steady
state of an economy. Instead, our focus is on the feasibility of a political compromise
among politicians, a possibility that Caballero and Yared do not address.
Empirically, deﬁning political competition and the quality of policies is a nontrivial
task, although one can look at the eﬀect of political turnover on government expenditures
and public debt for guidance about the relationship between political competition and
economic outcomes. The evidence is nevertheless rather ambiguous.9 The study of
Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010) is more directly related to our question. Using data
for US states since the nineteenth century, they ﬁnd that lack of political competition is
strongly associated with “bad,” anti-growth policies. But in their American environment
more political competition means simply the diﬀerence between elections contested by
two parties and elections won by a clearly dominant party. The analogy in our setting is
with moving from a single-party (“dictatorship”) to a bipartisan society, in which case
more political competition would indeed tend to enhance the eﬃciency of policies. The
empirical investigation that is perhaps closest in spirit to our analysis is Acemoglu, Reed
and Robinson’s (2013). They explore the eﬀects of the number of potential local political
rulers (“chiefs”) in Sierra Leone, whose number and identity were arguably exogenously
determined by the British colonial authorities in late nineteenth century. Acemoglu et
al. ﬁnd that the degree of political competition in a locality, as measured by its number
of chiefs, is positively correlated with several measures of economic development. That
ﬁnding resembles closely our result in the no-debt economy, which is probably a good
approximation for those regions, where rulers lack the ability to borrow extensively.
A key message from our analysis is, however, that the relationship between political
competition and economic outcomes hinges on the ability of governments to manipulate
the public debt. More generally, this implies that empirical analyses need to account for
the interaction eﬀect between measures of political competition and ﬁscal constraints,
or else risk being misspeciﬁed. We return to this point in section 4.
The paper is organized as follows. We study the relationship between party compe-
tition, political compromise and economic policy ﬁrst in a model without public debt
(section 2), and then allowing for unrestricted public debt (section 3). In section 4 we
discuss more generally how legislative constraints on government borrowing aﬀect the
desirability of political compromises. We conclude in section 5.
political instability aﬀects government expenditures, investment and long-run growth. She ﬁnds that a
greater probability of returning to power puts a break on the ineﬃciencies due to political uncertainty.
9For example, in a panel of 19 OECD countries over the 1970-95 period, Perotti and Kontopoulos
(2002) ﬁnd that larger coalition sizes in power (a proxy for the instability of the government) are
associated with more public expenditures, but Ricciuti (2004) ﬁnds no evidence that faster turnaround
in oﬃce leads to more government consumption and higher public debt. Similarly, Pettersson-Lidbom
(2001) ﬁnds that, for Swedish municipalities during 1974-94, a higher probability of political turnover
induces right-wing incumbents to accumulate debt, but leads left-wing ones to reduce the debt.
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2 A society without public debt
2.1 The economic and political environment
We consider a model that blends economic and political elements. There is a contin-
uum of identical households with Lebesgue measure one, a government, and a single
competitive ﬁrm producing an homogenous good under constant returns to scale. Pro-
duction requires only labor. Households are inﬁnitely-lived and enjoy utility from their
consumption and leisure, as well as from services generated by the government expen-
ditures g ≥ 0. Given market wages, tax rates on labor income and g, they choose how
much to consume and work. As this is a very standard setup, we leave its details to
Appendix 1.
What matters for our purposes is how much households enjoy g relative to its provi-
sion cost. Let U denote the utility that the typical household achieves in a competitive
equilibrium. We show in Appendix 1 that U is a function of g, in a relationship sim-
ilar to an indirect utility function. The economics underlying its properties is simple:
households enjoy an increase in g, but this comes at the cost of higher taxes. That is,
U captures the trade-oﬀ between the provision of g and its funding, concisely describing
households’ preferences over consumption, leisure and the public good. Having such
a convenient reduced-form representation considerably simpliﬁes the exposition, since
it allows us to focus on a single variable (g) instead of studying the simultaneously
determination of all variables of the whole economic model.
Government expenditures are bounded from above by the economy’s maximum fea-
sible output. Without loss of generality, we set this upper bound to one. We show in
Appendix 1 that U(g) is equal to either a real number or −∞. Therefore, U is a map
from [0, 1] into R¯. We also show that U(g) = −∞ only if g = 0 or g = 1. Such an
unboundedness of U would lead to a severe but uninteresting problem of equilibrium
multiplicity. To prevent that, we assume that g is bounded from below by a small pos-
itive number γ and from above by a number Γ smaller than one.10 These bounds can
be easily rationalized. Since the economy’s maximum output is one, to achieve g = 1
the government would need to tax all income while households choose to devote all their
available time to work despite the 100% tax. An upper bound on g below one is there-
fore a natural consequence of the limits on the government’s ability to raise taxes. The
lower bound γ can be understood as the value that the public expenditures would take
10Although this will become clearer after we describe the game played by the political parties, it is
not diﬃcult to see why such a restriction rules out a large family of uninteresting equilibria. Consider
the upper bound Γ. Since U(1) = −∞, if g = 1 at some date, then the household lifetime utility will
be equal to −∞. Hence, as long as political parties care to any extent about household welfare, trigger
strategies that specify reversion to the policy g = 1 could support any policy as an equilibrium outcome.
Similar reasoning justiﬁes the introduction of the lower bound γ. An alternative to the introduction of
the bounds γ and Γ consists in assuming that both U(0) and U(1) are larger than −∞.
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if the state were downsized to the minimum dimension allowed by law, since even such
a minimalist entity would entail some expenditures.
We assume that U is strictly concave, twice diﬀerentiable, and attains a maximum
at a point g∗ ∈ (γ,Γ).11 We call g∗ the eﬃcient policy.12 A household’s lifetime utility
is given by
∞
t=0 β
tU(gt), where β ∈ (0, 1) is the intertemporal discount factor.
A political party is a coalition of agents (“politicians”) who want to achieve power
to enjoy some extra utility/rents while in oﬃce. There is an exogenous natural number
n ≥ 2 of competing and identical political parties. The set of all political parties has
measure zero. We denote the set {1, 2, ..., n} of political parties by I and use the letter
i to denote a generic party in I. We refer to the party that holds power in a period by
p. We denote by O the set of opposition parties, i.e. the diﬀerence I − {p}.
The period preferences of party i are described by
Vi(g) = U(g) + 1iλg, (1)
where λ ≥ 0 and 1i denotes an indicator function that is one when party i is in oﬃce
and zero otherwise. Since 1i = 0 for all i ∈ O, the payoﬀ of an opposition party is
proportional to U . By contrast, the incumbent party cares about both government
expenditures and the welfare of its members/supporters as households. Parameter λ
describes the weight that the incumbent places on rents relative to household welfare.
There are at least two possible ways of interpreting the term λg. The ﬁrst is to
understand it as ego rents that increase as the government consumption grows. The
second is to interpret it as extra income (e.g., through corruption) that a politician
can obtain from public spending. The opportunities to enjoy those additional earnings
increase with the level of public expenditures.13
The period payoﬀ of an opposition party, in turn, is aligned with that of a typical
household, U(g). We adopt this assumption only for simplicity. The feature of represen-
tation (1) that really matters is that political parties perceive a higher relative beneﬁt
from public expenditures when in power than when out of power.
Although our goal is to study the eﬀect of diﬀerent degrees of political competition
on economic policy, it is useful to deﬁne a benchmark where political competition is
absent, which is equivalent to having n = 1. In this case, the function
V (g) = U(g) + λg (2)
11As an example, in Appendix 1 we show that U satisﬁes all these properties when the household has
Cobb-Douglas preferences over consumption, leisure and g.
12If lump-sum taxes are available in the underlying economy, then g∗ is Pareto eﬃcient. If only
distorting taxes are available, then g∗ is eﬃcient in a second-best sense; that is, in the terminology of
the optimal ﬁscal and monetary policy literature, g∗ is a Ramsey policy.
13Alternatively, one can interpret λ > 0 as a bias to spend public revenue ineﬃciently, on the “wrong”
areas (e.g. on sports stadiums, rather than on basic education).
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corresponds to the period payoﬀ of the everlasting ruling party. We deﬁne the maximizer
gD of V (g) as the dictatorial policy. Since g must lie in the set [γ,Γ], gD ≤ Γ and
U ′(gD) ≥ −λ; this last condition holds with equality whenever gD < Γ.
It should be clear that gD > g∗. Hence, a dictator overspends relative to what a
benevolent social planner would do. Moreover, gD is strictly increasing in λ whenever
gD < Γ. Thus, λ reﬂects the political parties’ degree of proﬂigacy, in the sense that an
incumbent who does not strategically interact with other political parties sets g = gD
and the diﬀerence gD − g∗ is increasing in λ.
The interval of time between elections is constant and so is an administration term.
We deﬁne units so that each period of time corresponds to a term. Political parties
cannot commit to speciﬁc policies. Furthermore, they share the same preferences before
knowing which of them will hold oﬃce. Hence, economic policy plays no role in vot-
ing decisions and elections are fought over other, non-economic, issues. As our focus is
on the intertemporal coordination of policies between current and future governments,
we assume that an election is simply a randomizing device that, at the beginning of
each period, selects party i to govern during that period with probability πi ≥ 0, with
i∈I πi = 1. For analytical convenience, with little additional loss of generality we
assume further that πi = 1/n for all i ∈ I, so that all parties are equally popular. This
assumption also helps in directly associating parameter n with the intensity of political
competition, or the frequency of political turnover. It is nevertheless straightforward
to generalize the analysis for heterogeneous πi. More generally, what is critical is that
neither political parties nor individuals can perfectly predict the outcome of future elec-
tions, and that more political competition makes winning elections more diﬃcult.
Our key assumptions are very similar, for example, to those of Aguiar and Amador
(2011) in their analysis of investment and growth patterns when governments can expro-
priate foreign capital. Like here, their political friction stems from incumbents enjoying
a higher payoﬀ from government consumption than non-incumbents, the government
does not have access to a commitment technology, and political turnover is exogenous
(although they allow for–exogenous–incumbency advantage).14
Our model is fully characterized by the array (β, U, γ,Γ, λ, n). Its ﬁrst four compo-
nents are economic factors, while the last two are political ones. Hence, we say that
(β,U, γ,Γ) is an economy and (λ, n) is a polity. We use the term society to denote a
combination of an economy and a polity–that is, the entire array (β, U, γ,Γ, λ, n).
14A similar observation applies to Azzimonti (2011), whose setup also features government and society
having diﬀerent objectives, with the former being unable to commit to policies.
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2.2 The policy game
To study how political competition impacts policy-making, we consider a game in which
the players are the political parties. The incumbent party selects current policies. Future
policies are chosen by future governments.
Let ht = (g0, g1, ..., gt) be a history of policies. At each date s, the incumbent party
p selects a date-s policy gs as a function of the history h
s−1. We denote that choice by
σp,s(h
s−1). The incumbent also chooses plans {σp,t}
∞
t=s+1 for future policies in case it
later returns to oﬃce. An opposition party o selects only plans {σo,t}
∞
t=s+1 for future
policies. Given an array [{σi,t}
∞
t=0]i∈I of policy plans and a history h
t−1, the date-t policy
will follow the rule
gt =

i∈I
1iσi,t(h
t−1).
In words, the actual policy gt is the choice of g for period t of the incumbent party in
period t.
At each date s, the lifetime payoﬀ Vi,s of party i is given by
Vi,s =
∞
t=s
βt−sVi(gt).
The incumbent party problem is the following. Given hs−1 and the other parties’ plans
[{σo,t}
∞
t=s+1]o∈O, it chooses a policy plan {σp,t}
∞
t=s to maximize the expected value of Vp,s.
Opposition parties solve a similar problem.
Given the ex-ante symmetry of political parties, it is natural to concentrate on sym-
metric outcomes. A symmetric political equilibrium is a policy plan {σt}
∞
t=0 with the
property that, if {σo,t}
∞
t=0 = {σt}
∞
t=0, so that all opposition parties follow the proposed
policy, then the solution of the incumbent’s problem at every period s for all histories
hs−1 is {σp,t}
∞
t=0 = {σt}
∞
t=s. A sequence {gt}
∞
t=0 is a symmetric political outcome if there
exists a symmetric political equilibrium {σt}
∞
t=0 such that σt(g0, ..., gt−1) = gt for all t.
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It is easy to see that gD is a stationary symmetric political outcome. Deﬁne the
dictatorial plan {σDt }
∞
t=0 so that, after any history h
t−1, every political party sets gt = g
D
if it holds power. Suppose that, at some date t, party p believes that all parties in O will
follow the plan {σDt }
∞
t=0. Clearly, the best course of action for party p is to implement
the plan {σDt }
∞
t=0 as well. Therefore, {σ
D
t }
∞
t=0 is a symmetric political equilibrium and
the corresponding outcome is gt = g
D for every t.
Having identiﬁed an equilibrium for the policy game, we can use trigger strategies to
characterize other symmetric political outcomes. To do so, we use a revert-to-dictatorship
policy plan. It speciﬁes that if all previous governments implemented a certain policy
15The symmetric political equilibrium is similar to the sustainable equilibrium introduced by Chari
and Kehoe (1990). As those authors point out, such an equilibrium entails subgame perfection.
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{gt}
∞
t=0, then the current incumbent does the same; otherwise, the incumbent implements
the dictatorial policy gD today and whenever it returns to oﬃce.
Denote by Ωs({gt}
∞
t=s) the expected value of Vp,s when all parties follow the policy
{gt}
∞
t=0. Thus,
Ωs({gt}
∞
t=s) = U(gs) + λgs +
∞
t=s+1
βt−s

U(gt) +
λ
n
gt

. (3)
With some abuse of notation, let Ω(g) represent the payoﬀ of party i when gt = g for
all t. It follows that
Ω(g) =
1
1− β

U(g) +

1− β +
β
n

λg

. (4)
If a policy {gt}
∞
t=0 satisﬁes
Ωs({gt}
∞
t=s) ≥ Ω(g
D) (5)
for every date s, then {gt}
∞
t=0 is a symmetric political outcome. The left-hand side of
(5) is the payoﬀ of the date-s incumbent if {gt}
∞
t=0 is implemented from date s onward,
while the right-hand side corresponds to the payoﬀ of that player if the dictatorial policy
is implemented from date s onward.
To see that (5) is a suﬃcient condition for {gt}
∞
t=0 to constitute a symmetric political
outcome, suppose that all parties in O follow the revert-to-dictatorship plan associated
with {gt}
∞
t=s. Consider the decision of party p at some date s. If the prevailing history
is {gt}
s−1
t=0 , then condition (5) ensures that implementing gt is optimal for party p. If the
prevailing history diﬀers from {gt}
s−1
t=0 , then all parties in O implement the dictatorial
policy gD whenever they come to oﬃce. As a consequence, the best action for party
p is to implement gD as well. Hence, the revert-to-dictatorship plan is a best-response
strategy for party p.
2.3 The political feasibility of the eﬃcient policy
Politicians can do better than just following the dictatorial policy if they coordinate
policies, i.e. if they forge a political compromise. We study ﬁrst the conditions under
which a political compromise can sustain the eﬃcient policy.
If gt = g
∗ for every t, then (5) can be written as Ω(g∗) ≥ Ω(gD). This inequality is
equivalent to
β
1− β

U(g∗)− U(gD) +
λ
n
(g∗ − gD)

≥ V (gD)− V (g∗). (6)
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Therefore, the eﬃcient policy is a symmetric political outcome if (6) holds. Its left-hand
side represents the present value of the future gains from cooperation for the incumbent,
whereas the right-hand side denotes its short-run gain from implementing the dictatorial
policy instead of the eﬃcient one.
From the deﬁnitions of g∗ and gD, we have that V (gD)−V (g∗) > 0, U(g∗)−U(gD) >
0, and (λ/n)(g∗ − gD) < 0. Therefore, the right-hand side of (6) is strictly positive but
its left-hand side, which is strictly increasing in n, may be negative for small values
of n. Intuitively, the gains from cooperation for the incumbent come from preventing
excessive public spending when it is not enjoying rents from those expenditures. If the
incumbent expects to return often to oﬃce, the circumstances under which it would
beneﬁt from cooperation become relatively rare and its gain from cooperation may turn
negative. This makes clear that the degree of political competition plays a crucial role
when it comes to the sustainability of the eﬃcient policy.
If the expression in the left-hand side of (6) were strictly positive, there are two
possibilities. Let us study each possibility in turn. Suppose ﬁrst that
β
1− β
[U(g∗)− U(gD)] ≤ V (gD)− V (g∗). (7)
Since (λ/n)(g∗−gD) < 0, inequality (6) would not hold regardless of the value of n. This
happens when a high λmakes the short-run gain from implementing gD too large relative
to the future gains under coordination. In this case, the eﬃcient policy is unachievable
through the revert-to-dictatorship strategy.
Proposition 1 For every economy (β, U, γ,Γ), there exists a number λ0 such that, if a
polity (λ, n) satisﬁes λ ≥ λ0, then inequality (7) holds. As a result, the eﬃcient policy
cannot be implemented by the revert-to-dictatorship strategy for any level of n.
Proof. See Online Appendix.16
Consider now the case in which (7) does not hold:
β
1− β
[U(g∗)− U(gD)] > V (gD)− V (g∗). (8)
It is then possible to place conditions on n that ensure that (6) holds and, as a conse-
quence, the eﬃcient policy constitutes a symmetric political outcome. Deﬁne
N0(β, λ) ≡
λ(g∗ − gD)
1−β
β
[V (gD)− V (g∗)]− [U(g∗)− U(gD)]
. (9)
It corresponds to the value of n that makes (6) hold with equality. Observe that (8)
implies that N0(β, λ) > 0.
16The Online Appendix is available at http://www.alexbcunha.com/research/papers/paper15oa.pdf.
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Proposition 2 If a society (β, U, γ,Γ, λ, n) satisﬁes (8) and n ≥ N0(β, λ), then the
eﬃcient policy g∗ constitutes a symmetric political outcome.
Proof. The left-hand side of (6) is strictly increasing in n, while its right-hand side
does not depend on n. Furthermore, (6) holds with equality for n = N0(β, λ). Thus, if
n ≥ N0(β, λ), (6) is satisﬁed. As a consequence, g∗ is a symmetric political outcome.
According to Proposition 2, N0(β, λ) deﬁnes the minimum number of parties that can
sustain g∗ as an equilibrium with the revert-to-dictatorship plan. Thus, if the eﬃcient
policy is sustainable in a polity (λ, n), it is also sustainable in a polity (λ, n′), where
n′ > n. In that sense, political competition fosters good economic policy.
It is important to stress that Proposition 2 does not depend on the assumption that
the period payoﬀ of an opposition party is equal to the utility U of a representative
household. Instead, it relies on the much weaker assumption that politicians have an
extra motivation to increase government expenditures when in power.
Our society can suﬀer from outcomes that diﬀer from the eﬃcient policy g∗ because
λ > 0 distorts the objectives of politicians away from those of society at large. Propo-
sition 2 shows that a high n can oﬀset the adverse eﬀects of a positive λ. However,
as Proposition 1 makes clear, such a conclusion holds only if politicians are not too
proﬂigate (i.e., λ is not too large). This result becomes particularly relevant when one
observes that the diﬀerences gD− g∗ and U(g∗)−U(gD) are weakly increasing functions
of λ. Hence, exactly when the political distortions can be more severe, competition
among the political agents fails to discipline them.
2.4 The politically optimal policy
Our policy game has many equilibrium outcomes. Up to now we have focused on the
eﬃcient outcome because it maximizes household welfare. However, even if that outcome
were sustainable, the political parties may coordinate on an alternative policy. We
present now an equilibrium selection criterion and characterize the resulting equilibrium.
If the players of our game are able to coordinate on outcomes distinct from the
dictatorial policy, they will plausibly choose to coordinate on the best policy from their
own perspective. Since the incumbent is the only player to implement an action at each
date t, it is sensible to consider a stationary outcome where the incumbent proposes
the (time-invariant) policy over which the parties coordinate. Due to the symmetry of
the political parties, this proposed policy is independent of who holds oﬃce. Hence, in
this equilibrium all political parties agree on implementing a stationary policy gC that
maximizes Ω in the universe of time-invariant policies–i.e., gC maximizes (4). As it
depends on β, λ and n, we denote it by gC(β, λ, n). We call this most cooperative policy
the politically optimal policy. Note that, among stationary policies, gC is optimal from
the perspective of the incumbent, whereas g∗ is optimal from society’s viewpoint.
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Recall that gD maximizes V (g) = U(g) + λg. Since 0 < 1 − β + β/n < 1, we can
substitute (1− β + β/n)λ for λ in the deﬁnition of V to conclude that it is possible to
apply our characterization of gD to identify some of the properties of gC. This reasoning
establishes that g∗ < gC(β, λ, n) ≤ gD. Moreover, gC is weakly increasing in λ and
weakly decreasing in n. Furthermore, if inequality
gC(β, λ, n) < Γ (10)
holds, gC(β, λ, n) is an interior optimum satisfying
U ′(gC(β, λ, n)) = − (1− β + β/n)λ. (11)
In that case, gC(β, λ, n) < gD, gC(β, λ, n) is strictly increasing in λ, and
∂gC
∂n
=
βλ
n2U ′′(gC(β, λ, n))
< 0. (12)
The intuition for the last result is simple. As n increases, the incumbent’s future expected
rents per period, (λ/n)g, decrease. Hence, its payoﬀ is maximized at a lower level of g,
which is closer to g∗.
Deﬁne ∆C0 (n) according to
∆C0 (n) ≡ Ω(g
C(β, λ, n), n)− Ω(gD, n),
where we emphasize that Ω depends on n both directly and indirectly, through gC.
Expression ∆C0 (n) corresponds to the gain for the incumbent when the parties pursue
this cooperative policy, relative to its payoﬀ without cooperation.
Suppose that the political parties establish a political compromise to implement gC.
We show that if political competition increases, then so do household welfare and the
politicians’ gain from cooperation.
Proposition 3 If (10) holds, then both household welfare and politicians’ payoﬀ under
the politically optimal policy, respectively U(gC(β, λ, n)) and ∆C0 (n), are strictly increas-
ing in the degree of political competition, n.
Proof. Since ∂U(g
C)
∂n
= U ′(gC)∂g
C
∂n
, combining (11) with (12) implies that ∂U(g
C)
∂n
> 0.
Furthermore,
d∆C0
dn
=

∂Ω(gC , n)
∂g
∂gC
∂n
+
∂Ω(gC , n)
∂n

−

∂Ω(gD, n)
∂g
∂gD
∂n
+
∂Ω(gD, n)
∂n

.
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However, ∂Ω(g
C ,n)
∂g
= 0 by the envelope theorem, ∂g
D
∂n
= 0 because the degree of political
competition does not aﬀect gD, and ∂Ω(g,n)
∂n
= − βλ
(1−β)n2
g. Therefore,
d∆C0
dn
= −
βλ
(1− β)n2
gC +
βλ
(1− β)n2
gD =
βλ
(1− β)n2
(gD − gC) > 0,
concluding the proof.
One can easily grasp the intuition underlying Proposition 3. If gC is an interior
optimum, then the diﬀerence

gC(β, λ, n)− g∗

decreases as political competition inten-
siﬁes. The same conclusion applies to |U(gC(β, λ, n)) − U(g∗)|. Furthermore, by not
implementing the dictatorial policy, the incumbent has an expected rent loss per period
equal to (λ/n)(gD − gC). A higher n decreases that loss.
We assume that coordination among the political parties is costless (and there are
no collective action-like problems), but this may be unrealistic. For a moment, suppose
instead that the parties would need to incur in a ﬁxed organizational cost F > 0 if
they wanted to implement gC . The feasibility of gC in such a case would hinge on
whether ∆C0 (n) ≥ F . The ﬂavor of our ﬁndings would nevertheless remain unchanged:
because d∆C0 /dn > 0 (Proposition 3), more intense political competition would make
that condition more likely to hold (in the sense of increasing the range of parameters
where it holds).17
As pointed out before, gC(β, λ, n) > g∗. However, gC is weakly decreasing in n.
Moreover, Proposition 3 implies that if (10) holds, then U(gC(β, λ, n)) increases with n.
Therefore, one could be tempted to believe that gC(β, λ, n) would converge to g∗as n
goes to ∞. This would be incorrect, however, as gC(β, λ, n) is bounded away from g∗.
Proposition 4 Let (β,U, γ,Γ) be any economy. For every λ > 0, there exists a number
gC(β, λ) with the property that g∗ < gC(β, λ) ≤ gC(β, λ, n) for every n.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
We ﬁnish this section with a brief summary of our main ﬁndings, which are repre-
sented in Figure 1 for λ < λ0. We consider a repeated political game in which the players
are competing political parties and the incumbent party has an inherent penchant for
allocating more resources to public expenditures than is socially optimal. If politicians
are very proﬂigate (λ > λ0), the eﬃcient outcome is politically infeasible, regardless of
the degree of political competition. In such a case, the welfare level U(g∗) illustrated
in Figure 1 is unachievable. Otherwise, suﬃciently strong competition among political
parties can support a political compromise that yields the eﬃcient outcome.
17The exception is when the organization cost F increases with the number of political parties. In
that case, one would need to compare the rate of increase of F (n) and of ∆C
0
(n).
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Figure 1: The welfare impact of political competition; no public debt, λ < λ0
The political parties may choose instead to coordinate on a policy that maximizes
the incumbent’s present value payoﬀ at each date. By construction, such a policy is
an equilibrium outcome. Hence, a welfare level of U(gC(n = 2)) is always politically
feasible. Furthermore, this policy has the property that an increase in the degree of
political competition leads to higher aggregate welfare (converging to U(gc) as n→∞),
thus making politicians interests increasingly aligned with society’s interests.
Therefore, in the context studied in this section, where the actions of the political
party in oﬃce have no bearing on the options available to future governments, there is
a clear sense in which more political competition fosters the implementation of better
policies and improves economic performance. As we will see, this is no longer true when
current policies can aﬀect the set of actions available to future governments.
3 A society with unrestricted public debt
We now show how the public debt impacts the strategic interaction between politicians.
We will see that it is no longer true that intense political competition fosters the imple-
mentation of better economic policies.
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3.1 The economic and political environment
We extend the model of the previous section by allowing an incumbent to issue public
debt. Denote its beginning-of-period t value by bt. This variable is measured in the
same units as gt and its initial value b0 is exogenous and equal to zero.
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In section 2, the period payoﬀ function of a typical household is similar to an indirect
utility function that captures the structure of the underlying economy. That function is
shaped by the trade-oﬀ between the provision of the public good and its funding. The
introduction of public debt aﬀects that tradeoﬀ. In particular, the vector (bt, gt, bt+1)
deﬁnes the level of distortionary taxes required to balance the government period budget
constraint.19 Accordingly, in this section we describe the payoﬀ of a typical household
by a function U(bt, gt, bt+1). As in the previous section, that function is a convenient
representation of a typical household’s utility level in a competitive equilibrium. It is
is shaped by the tradeoﬀ between providing the public good, raising distortionary tax
revenues, and managing the public debt. Of course, that tradeoﬀ depends on the interest
rate, which is a built-in component of U and other elements of our model.
In Appendix 2 we provide an example of a simple dynamic general equilibrium model
for which the payoﬀ representation we postulate here either (i) exactly describes or
(ii) provides a steady-state approximation of the typical household’s utility. In the
latter case, the approximation perfectly matches the household’s lifetime utility for every
equilibrium we study.
For notational convenience, we will often denote bt and bt+1 by, respectively, b and
b′. We denote the partial derivatives of U by Ub, Ug and Ub′ . Similar notation is used for
the second-order derivatives. We assume that U is strictly concave in g: Ugg(b, g, b
′) < 0.
We also assume that
Ub′(b, g, b
′) ≥ 0, Ubg(b, g, b
′) < 0, and Ugb′(b, g, b
′) > 0. (13)
If b and g are held constant, an increase in b′ reduces the amount of distortionary taxes
required to balance the government period budget constraint. This justiﬁes the ﬁrst
inequality. Analogously, if g and b′ are held constant, an increase in b leads to an
increase in the tax burden, lowering the marginal utility of g. Similarly, Ug should be an
strictly increasing function of b′. Furthermore, if the public debt is held constant over
time at a level b, then an increase in that level requires, for a ﬁxed g, an increase in the
18We show in Appendix 2 that, if b0 were not equal to zero, the eﬃcient policy would change from
date zero to date one and be constant thereafter. Such a transition would make the notation heavier
and the analysis slightly more complicated, without adding any meaningful insight.
19The results of section 2 do not depend on whether the government has access to lump-sum taxes or
not. However, at least since Barro (1974) it is well known that, if lump-sum taxes are available, then
the government can relax any constraint imposed by the public debt by simply raising tax revenues
that exactly match the value of its outstanding bonds. Hence, our present goal requires us to assume
that lump-sum taxes are not available in the underlying economy.
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tax burden to fund the debt service; hence, the marginal utility of g should fall. Thus,
we require Ubg(b, g, b) + Ugb′(b, g, b) < 0.
The government’s ability to raise tax revenue places bounds on its consumption and
interest expenditures. Let r denote the steady-state interest rate. As usual, r and β are
linked through β = (1 + r)−1. Let B¯ > 0 denote the maximum value the public debt
can reach at any given date. It has the property that the sum γ + rB¯ is equal to the
maximum amount of tax revenue the government can raise in a single period. Observe
that, if bt+1 = B¯ for some date t, then (gs, bs+1) will be equal to (γ, B¯) for every s ≥ t+1.
That is, if the debt ever reaches its maximum attainable value, the economy becomes
locked in the state (γ, B¯) permanently.
The debt may also take on negative values. In that case, the typical household
becomes a debtor. The household’s ability to repay its debt is bounded by the lifetime
income that it could obtain by working all available time at every date t. Thus, there
must be a real number b¯ ≥ 0 such that bt ≥ −b¯ for all t.
To formalize the mechanism through which the incumbent inﬂuences the set of ac-
tions available to future governments, let f b(b) be a strictly increasing and continuously
diﬀerentiable function. The date-t government choice of bt+1 must satisfy
bt+1 ∈ [f
b(bt), B¯]. (14)
Since f b is strictly increasing, a rise in bt shrinks the set [f
b(bt), B¯]. Thus, by increasing
the debt it leaves to its successor, the incumbent at date t − 1 restricts the choice of
bt+1 of the next administration. Furthermore, f
b(B¯) = B¯, because the economy is locked
in the state (γ, B¯) if the public debt ever reaches the value B¯.
We model the constraints that bt and bt+1 place on gt with the continuously diﬀeren-
tiable function f g(b, b′). This function is strictly decreasing in b and strictly increasing
in b′. The choice of gt must satisfy
gt ∈ [γ, f
g(bt, bt+1)]. (15)
The role of the upper bound Γ in the previous section is now played by f g(bt, bt+1).
The set [γ, f g(bt, bt+1)] shrinks when bt increases. The equality f
g(B¯, B¯) = γ must hold,
because γ is the only admissible value for gt whenever bt = B¯. Suppose now that bt
is equal to some generic value b for every t. The higher the value of b, the higher the
interest to be paid by the government and, as a consequence, the tighter its budget
constraint. Hence, the partial derivatives of f g must satisfy f gb (b, b) + f
g
b′(b, b) < 0.
Whoever is in oﬃce at date t can increase bt+1 to enlarge the set from which gt is
selected. Such an increase in bt+1 also restricts the choices of the next administration
by tightening constraints (14) and (15). Hence, the date-t incumbent can increase the
end-of-period debt bt+1 to achieve simultaneously two goals: ﬁrst, relax the constraints
it faces when selecting gt; second, tighten the constraints the next period government
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will face when selecting (gt+1, bt+2). In the limiting case in which bt+1 = B¯, the date-t
incumbent permanently locks the society in the state (γ, B¯). These properties of the
public debt play a central role in the process of constructing an equilibrium for our game.
Let g∗(b, b′) denote the value of g that maximizes U(b, g, b′) under the constraint γ ≤
g ≤ f g(b, b′). We assume that, if b < B¯, then g∗(b, b′) < fg(b, b′).20 Furthermore, if the
government holds its debt constant at some generic level b, the amount of distortionary
revenue needed to balance the government budget will be a strictly increasing function
of b:
b < bˆ⇒ U(b, g∗ (b, b) , b) > U(bˆ, g∗(bˆ, bˆ), bˆ). (16)
The eﬃcient policy in this context is the attainable sequence {g∗t , b
∗
t+1}
∞
t=0 that max-
imizes
∞
t=0 β
tU(bt, gt, bt+1). For the underlying economy that we consider in Appen-
dix 2, b∗t+1 = 0 for every t. Therefore, g
∗
t = g
∗(0, 0) for every t.21 As in Section 2,
V (b, g, b′) = U(b, g, b′) + λg describes the period preferences of a dictator who stays in
power forever. The dictatorial policy {gDt , b
D
t+1}
∞
t=0 maximizes
∞
t=0 β
tV (bt, gt, bt+1). We
show in the Appendix 2 that the dictatorial policy is static, with bDt+1 = 0 for every t.
Hence, the eﬃcient and dictatorial debt levels are identical. However, as in the economy
without debt, government expenditures are ineﬃciently high under a dictatorship.
In the present context, an economy is an array (β,U, γ, fg, f b, B¯). The political
structure is exactly as in section 2. Thus, a polity is a vector (λ, n) and a society is the
combination of an economy and a polity.
3.2 The policy game
We modify the game of the previous section as little as possible. The players are the
same. A history of policies is now an array ht = ((g0, b1), (g1, b2), ..., (gt, bt+1)). After
observing ht−1, the date-t incumbent selects a policy (gt, bt+1). The period payoﬀ of a
generic party i is Vi(b, g, b
′) = U(b, g, b′) + 1iλg, while the probability that any given
party will be elected is equal to 1/n.
The deﬁnition of a symmetric political equilibrium is similar to the one adopted in
the previous section. If {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=0 is a symmetric political outcome, then the payoﬀ of
the date-s incumbent is
Ωs({gt, bt+1}
∞
t=s) = U(bs, gs, bs+1) + λgs +
∞
t=s+1
βt−s

U(bt, gt, bt+1) +
λ
n
gt

. (17)
20This assumption implies that, given b and b′, the optimal g is smaller than its attainable upper
bound. Hence, a proﬂigate government has room to overspend without increasing the public debt unless
B = B¯.
21Naturally, since our environment is stationary, there is no role for the tax smoothing property of
the public debt (as originally indicated by Barro 1979).
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3.3 The spendthrift equilibrium
We now turn to the characterization of an equilibrium outcome that we will use to
support other equilibria by means of trigger strategies. However, the task here is not as
simple as in the previous section because, even if the date-t incumbent believes that all
other parties will implement the dictatorial policy regardless of the history ht−1, it may
ﬁnd optimal to issue debt to fund a level of gt above the dictatorial level.
To characterize the equilibria set of our political game, it is convenient to deﬁne a
function G(b, b′, λ) that solves
max
g
[U(b, g, b′) + λg] (18)
subject to22
g ≤ fg(b, b′). (19)
Function G(.) deﬁnes the level of g that maximizes the incumbent’s period payoﬀ, given
(b, b′). The ﬁrst-order condition associated with this problem is
Ug(b, G(b, b
′, λ), b′) ≥ −λ. (20)
This condition holds with equality whenever (19) does not bind.
We show in Lemma 2 of the Online Appendix that G(.) is strictly decreasing in b,
strictly increasing in b′, and weakly increasing in λ. The intuition behind those properties
is simple. If g and b′ are held constant, an increase in b requires the government to
increase its distortionary revenues. Since the deﬁnition of G entails ﬁnding an optimal
balance between government consumption and distortionary taxation, G decreases as b
rises. Similar reasoning implies that G increases in b′. Furthermore, a simple inspection
of (18) suggests that G should be increasing in λ.23
Suppose that the date-t incumbent believes that all other parties will leave a debt
B¯ regardless of the debt they inherited. If under this assumption the best strategy for
the date-t incumbent is to set bt+1 = B¯, then we have an equilibrium in which the ﬁrst
incumbent enjoys a relatively high payoﬀ and future governments have no option but to
set gt = γ and bt+1 = B¯. In particular, for the policy plan
σ˜t(h
t−1) = (G(bt, B¯, λ), B¯) (21)
to be a symmetric political equilibrium for every ht−1, λ must be suﬃciently large. In
this equilibrium, the corresponding outcome is {g˜t, b˜t+1}
∞
t=0, where g˜t+1 = γ and b˜t+1 = B¯
for every t, while g˜0 = G(0, B¯, λ). That is, the date-0 incumbent sets a value for g0 high
22Another constraint is g ≥ γ, but it never binds.
23The only hurdle in the process of formalizing that reasoning is that constraint (19) binds at some
(b, b′, λ). As a result, the partial derivatives Gb, Gb′ , and Gλ may be undeﬁned at those points.
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enough to drive the economy to a steady state characterized by γ and B¯. We refer to
this equilibrium and its outcome as the spendthrift equilibrium.24
Since λ measures politicians’ degree of proﬂigacy, at ﬁrst glance it may seem obvious
that the spendthrift policy would be an equilibrium outcome if λ were large enough.
However, this need not be true. For instance, recall that bDt+1 = 0 for every t. Hence,
regardless of λ, a dictator would not expand the public debt. The reason is that a high
λ represents a penchant for rents today but also in the future, and setting b1 = B¯ would
dry future rents up to its minimum level.
Hence, for the spendthrift policy to be an equilibrium outcome, two conditions need
to be met:
(C1) politicians are suﬃciently proﬂigate;
(C2) the rate at which an incumbent can substitute gt for gt+1 is not too small.
To understand these conditions, let qt denote the price, in units of gt, of bt+1. By
issuing one unit of bt+1 the government can increase gt by qt units. To balance its date
t+1 budget, the government can reduce gt+1 by exactly one unit. Hence, an incumbent
can use the public debt to substitute gt for gt+1 at a rate equal to qt.
The partial derivatives of the date-t incumbent’s payoﬀ with respect to gt and gt+1
are equal to, respectively, Ug(bt, gt, bt+1)+λ and β[Ug(bt+1, gt+1, bt+2)+λ/n]. Therefore,
−
dgt
dgt+1
= β
Ug(bt+1, gt+1, bt+2) + λ/n
Ug(bt, gt, bt+1) + λ
,
where −dgt/dgt+1 is a standard intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. As a con-
sequence, the date-t incumbent has an incentive to increase gt and to reduce gt+1 by
issuing debt whenever the following inequality holds:
qt > β
Ug(bt+1, gt+1, bt+2) + λ/n
Ug(bt, gt, bt+1) + λ
. (22)
Inequality (22) unwraps how the combination of political competition with conditions
(C1) and (C2) brings forth the spendthrift equilibrium. Make λ → ∞. Since Ug is
bounded, the right-hand side of (22) converges to β/n. Hence, for λ suﬃciently large,
(22) holds whenever
qt > β/n. (23)
It is well know from basic Macroeconomics that, if an economy is in a deterministic
steady-state, qt = β. Thus, if λ is large and qt is not considerably smaller than its
24The spendthrift equilibrium shares some characteristics with the ﬁnancial autarky equilibrium of
Aguiar and Amador (2011), where a deviation by the government from its promised payments locks the
country forever in ﬁnancial autarky; as a result, the deviating government chooses to set the tax rate
at is maximum possible value.
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steady-state value, the date-t incumbent will have an incentive to issue debt and increase
gt.
We formally establish in the Online Appendix that if conditions (C1) and (C2) are
satisﬁed, then the spendthrift policy is an equilibrium outcome. For condition (C1), we
require that
λ > λ˜, (24)
where λ˜ is a real number whose existence is established in that Appendix.25
In turn, condition (C2) entails placing a lower bound on qt. Since that variable is
not an explicit component of our political game, we must disentangle that variable from
the whole structure of the game.
To do so, take a policy {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=s with the property that gt = G(bt, bt+1, λ). For
simplicity, assume that the partial derivatives Gb and Gb′ are deﬁned at every point
(b, b′, λ). Let t be any date and δ a small positive number. If bt+1 increases by δ,
gt will grow by approximately δGb′(bt, bt+1, λ), while gt+1 will fall by approximately
−δGb(bt+1, bt+2, λ). Hence, a policymaker can substitute gt for gt+1 at the rate
−
δGb′(bt, bt+1, λ)
δGb(bt+1, bt+2, λ)
= −
Gb′(bt, bt+1, λ)
Gb(bt+1, bt+2, λ)
.
However, the rate at which a policymaker can substitute gt for gt+1 is also equal to qt.
Therefore, we can express qt as
qt = −
Gb′(bt, bt+1, λ)
Gb(bt+1, bt+2, λ)
.
Substituting back into (23), that condition becomes
−
Gb′(bt, bt+1, λ)
Gb(bt+1, bt+2, λ)
>
β
n
.
For this condition to hold for all n, we need that
−
Gb′(bt, bt+1, λ)
Gb(bt+1, bt+2, λ)
>
β
2
. (25)
In the Online Appendix we provide a more general version of (25) that takes into consid-
eration, among other technical issues, that Gb and Gb′ may be undeﬁned at some points
(b, b′, λ).
All that being said, henceforth we assume that conditions (C1) and (C2) are satisﬁed,
so that the spendthrift policy is an equilibrium outcome.
25When λ ≤ λ˜ one can show that, if V satisﬁes some regularity conditions, then there exists an
equilibrium outcome in which the public debt converges, at an increasing rate, to B¯. Given that
outcome, it is possible to characterize a subset of all equilibrium outcomes. By contrast, under (24),
one can characterize the entire set, in addition to allowing for a faster transition to the state (γ, B¯).
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3.3.1 Example
We provide below examples of functions U and f g, with reasonable and easily under-
standable features, that lead to a G satisfying (25). Let
U(b, g, b′) = −
1
2
	
g − a1e
−a2b

2
+ a3(b
′ − b)g +W (b, b′) (26)
and
f g(b, b′) = γ + (2a4 − a5)B¯ − 2a4b+ a5b
′, (27)
where a1, a2, a3, a4, and a5 are positive constants and W is any diﬀerentiable function
increasing in b′.
Consider ﬁrst the function U . Observe that its partial derivatives satisfy (13). To
grasp the meaning of parameters a1, a2, and a3, take debt values b and b
′ smaller than
B¯. Then, g∗(b, b′) = a3(b
′ − b) + a1e
−a2b. Since g∗(0, 0) = a1, we can interpret a1 as a
parameter that deﬁnes the eﬃcient level of g. Parameter a2 deﬁnes the impact of equal
variations in b′ and b over g∗, while a3 measures the impact of the public debt growth
(b′ − b) on g∗.
The function f g is a plain aﬃne relation. In line with our description of the economic
features of the model, f gb < 0, f
g
b′ > 0, and f
g(B¯, B¯) = γ. Its parameters a4 and a5
deﬁne the respective impacts of changes in b and b′ on the upper bound of gt.
The function G induced by (26) and (27) satisﬁes inequality (25) for several vectors
(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5). Take a point (b, b
′, λ) such that G(b, b′, λ) = f g(b, b′). It follows that
(25) holds whenever a5 > βa4. Take now a point (b, b
′, λ) such that G(b, b′, λ) < f g(b, b′).
Then (19) does not bind and G(b, b′, λ) = a3(b
′ − b) + a1e
−a2b + λ. For simplicity, let
the lower bound on b satisfy b¯ = 0; therefore, (25) holds for every value of b′ and b if
(2− β)a3 > βa1a2.
3.4 The political feasibility of the eﬃcient policy
We use trigger strategies that specify reversion to the spendthrift policy plan {σ˜t}
∞
t=0 to
characterize a set of equilibrium outcomes. Deﬁne the revert-to-spendthrift plan associ-
ated with a policy {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=0 as a plan such that, if the prevailing history is exactly
{gt, bt+1}
s−1
t=0 , a player sticks to the policy {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=0; otherwise, the player implements
the policy speciﬁed in (21). If the policy {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=0 satisﬁes
Ωs({gt, bt+1}
∞
t=s) ≥ U(bs, G(bs, B¯, λ), B¯) +
λG(bs, B¯, λ) +
∞
t=s+1
βt−s

U(B¯, γ, B¯) +
λ
n
γ

(28)
for every s, then {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=0 is a symmetric policy outcome. This is so because in-
equality (28) ensures that the corresponding revert-to-spendthrift plan is an equilibrium
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strategy. Observe that condition (28) is not only suﬃcient, but also necessary for a pol-
icy {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=0 to be an equilibrium outcome. Indeed, if (28) were not satisﬁed at some
date s, the incumbent could implement (G(bs, B¯, λ), B¯) and achieve the payoﬀ speciﬁed
in the right-hand side.
Since (28) is a necessary and suﬃcient condition that any symmetric policy outcome
must satisfy, it provides a complete characterization of the set of all symmetric political
outcomes. This allows us to obtain results stronger than those of section 2.
With some abuse of notation, let Ω(g, b) denote the payoﬀ of the incumbent party if
all parties implement the static policy (g, b). Hence,
Ω(g, b) =
1
1− β

U(b, g, b) +

1− β +
β
n

λg

. (29)
It follows from (28) that the eﬃcient policy (g∗(0, 0), 0) is a symmetric political outcome
if and only if Ω(g∗(0, 0), 0) ≥ Ω0({g˜t, b˜t+1}
∞
t=0). Let ∆U ≡ U(0, g
∗(0, 0), 0)− U(B¯, γ, B¯)
and ∆V ≡ V (0, G(0, B¯, λ), B¯)− V (0, g∗(0, 0), 0). The last inequality is equivalent to
β
1− β

∆U +
λ
n
(g∗(0, 0)− γ)

≥ ∆V . (30)
The right-hand side is the short-run gain for an incumbent from selecting the spend-
thrift policy instead of the eﬃcient one. The left-hand side corresponds to its future
payoﬀ gain from the implementation of the eﬃcient instead of the spendthrift policy.
Since g∗(B¯, B¯) = γ, an appeal to (16) establishes that U(0, g∗(0, 0), 0) > U(B¯, γ, B¯).
Moreover, g∗(0, 0) > γ. Therefore, the left-hand side is strictly positive and strictly
decreasing in n. The right-hand side is also positive, since
V (0, G(0, B¯, λ), B¯) > V (0, g∗(0, 0), B¯) ≥ V (0, g∗(0, 0), 0).
Consider the inequalities
β
1− β
∆U ≥ ∆V (31)
and
β
1− β
∆U < ∆V . (32)
Similarly to section 2, the analysis depends on which of the two inequalities holds.
However, the comparison between g∗ and the level of g achieved in the absence of
coordination–γ in the current setting and gD in the previous one, where γ < g∗(0, 0) <
gD–has critical implications for the consequences of political competition.
Proposition 5 If a society (β, U, γ, fg, f b, B¯, λ, n) satisﬁes (31), the eﬃcient policy
(g∗(0, 0), 0) constitutes a symmetric political outcome.
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Proof. Combine inequalities (31) and (λ/n)(g∗(0, 0) − γ) > 0 to conclude that (30)
holds. As a consequence, (g∗(0, 0), 0) is an equilibrium outcome.
If politicians are suﬃciently proﬂigate and the payoﬀs satisfy (31), the eﬃcient policy
is an equilibrium outcome regardless of the degree of political competition. There was
no such a result in section 2. It arises here because the eﬃcient policy yields a level of
rents greater than its level under the spendthrift equilibrium after date zero.
The analysis is richer when inequality (32) holds. Deﬁne N b(β, λ) as
N b(β, λ) ≡
λ(g∗(0, 0)− γ)
1−β
β
∆V −∆U
. (33)
Observe that, under (32), N b(β, λ) > 0.
Proposition 6 If a society (β, U, γ, fg, f b, B¯, λ, n) satisﬁes (32), the eﬃcient policy
(g∗(0, 0), 0) constitutes a symmetric political outcome if and only if n ≤ N b(β, λ).
Proof. We start with the “if” part. Condition (30) holds with equality when n =
N b(β, λ). Since the left-hand side of (30) is strictly decreasing in n, it holds whenever
n ≤ N b(β, λ). Hence, the eﬃcient policy is a symmetric political outcome. For the “only
if” part, assume that (g∗(0, 0), 0) is an equilibrium outcome. Therefore, (30) must hold.
As a consequence, n ≤ N b(β, λ).
Some implications of Proposition 6 are quite diﬀerent from those of its counterpart
under no public debt, Proposition 2. First, Proposition 2 lays down a suﬃcient condition,
while Proposition 6 establishes one that is necessary and suﬃcient. Second, and more
importantly, the function N b(β, λ) establishes the maximum number of parties that
allows for sustaining the eﬃcient policy through trigger strategies. Thus, when the
government is free to issue debt, the implementation of the eﬃcient policy requires an
upper bound–instead of a lower bound–on the number of competing parties.
The combination of Propositions 5 and 6 implies that, provided that politicians are
suﬃciently proﬂigate, the eﬃcient policy can be an equilibrium outcome regardless of
whether (31) or (32) holds. If the former prevails, the eﬃcient policy is an equilibrium
outcome for every value of n. But if the latter holds, then political competition cannot
be too intense. Therefore, it is important to understand the conditions that determine
which of those inequalities will prevail.
Lemma 1 For every economy (β, U, γ, f g, f b, B¯), there exists a number λb0 such that, if
a polity (λ, n) satisﬁes λ > λb0, then inequality (32) holds.
Proof. See Online Appendix.
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If N b(β, λ) < 2 and λ > λb0, Proposition 6 and Lemma 1 would imply that the
eﬃcient policy could not be an equilibrium outcome. However, note that N b(β, λ) > 2
if β is suﬃciently close to one. Henceforth we concentrate on this more interesting case.
It follows that, if politicians are very proﬂigate but consumers are suﬃciently patient,
then some, but not too much political competition is necessary and suﬃcient to ensure
that the eﬃcient policy is a symmetric political outcome.
Corollary 1 For every economy (β, U, γ, f g, f b, B¯), if a polity (λ, n) satisﬁes λ > λb0,
the eﬃcient policy (g∗(0, 0), 0) constitutes a symmetric political outcome if and only if
n ≤ N b(β, λ).
3.5 The feasibility of the politically optimal policy
Again, if the parties are able to forge a compromise in which they coordinate policies
intertemporally, they will presumably choose such policies optimally. We focus on the
static policy that maximizes the payoﬀ of the date-0 incumbent. By construction, it also
maximizes (among static policies) the payoﬀ of the date-t incumbent for each date t.
To characterize this cooperative equilibrium for a given b, we redeﬁne gC as the value
of g that maximizes Ω(g, b) subject to g ≤ f g(b, b). If that constraint does not bind, the
necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst-order condition is Ωg(g
C , b) = 0, which is equivalent to
Ug(b, g
C(b, β, λ, n), b) = − (1− β + β/n)λ. (34)
Observe the similarity between this condition and the ﬁrst-order condition for gC in the
model without debt. Furthermore, if the politicians coordinate on a static policy, the
cooperative level of the public debt bC must be equal to b0. Since b0 = 0, we have that
bC = 0. Therefore, the same properties of gC discussed in the previous section also apply
to gC(b) ≡ gC(b, β, λ, n).
There are, however, important diﬀerences in the payoﬀ implications of gC(b). Deﬁne
the incumbent gain from implementing the cooperative instead of the spendthrift policy:
∆Cb (n) ≡ Ω(g
C(0), 0)− Ω0({g˜t, b˜t+1}
∞
t=0)
= Ω(gC(0), 0)− Ω(γ, B¯) + V (B¯, γ, B¯)− V (0, G(0, B¯, λ), B¯).
We have the following.
Proposition 7 If gC(0, β, λ, n) < f g(0, 0), then U(0, gC(0, β, λ, n), 0) is strictly increas-
ing in n and ∆Cb (n) is strictly decreasing in n.
Proof. It suﬃces to apply the reasoning adopted in Proposition 3; a complete proof is
available in the Online Appendix.
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Intuitively, as n increases, gC(0, β, λ, n) moves toward g∗(0, 0). As a consequence,
the payoﬀ of the representative household under the cooperative policy approaches its
eﬃcient level–although, in the spirit of Proposition 4, one can show that gC(0, β, λ, n)
is bounded away from g∗(0, 0). On the other hand, by implementing the politically
optimal policy the incumbent earns in each future period an expected rent gain of
(λ/n)[gC(0, β, λ, n)− γ]. This rent clearly decreases with n.
By construction Ω(gC(0), 0) ≥ Ω(g, 0) for all g, so (gC(0), 0) is the static policy that
allows for cooperation under the broadest set of parameters. Thus, if a static policy (g, 0)
is a symmetric political outcome, so is (gC(0), 0). Since the eﬃcient policy is static, if
it is an equilibrium outcome, then so is the politically optimal policy. We can then
apply Proposition 6 to conclude that if a society (β, U, γ, f g, f b, B¯, λ, n) satisﬁes (32)
and n ≤ N b(β, λ), then the politically optimal policy is a symmetric political outcome.
Conversely, if (gC(0), 0) is not an equilibrium policy, then no static policy will be.
And in contrast to the b ≡ 0 case, (gC(0), 0) need not be an equilibrium outcome. If we
evaluate the left-hand side of (28) at (gC(0), 0), that inequality becomes
Ω(gC(0), 0) ≥ Ω0({g˜t, b˜t+1}
∞
t=0). (35)
We cannot be sure that this inequality holds, since the policy in the right-hand side is
not static. In fact, if λ is large, then n has to be suﬃciently small for (gC(0), 0) to be
an symmetric equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 8 Let (β, U, γ, f g, f b, B¯) be any economy. There exist numbers λb1 and
NC(β, λ) with the property that, for every polity (λ, n) satisfying λ > λb1, the politically
optimal policy (gC(0, β, λ, n), 0) is a symmetric political outcome if and only if n ≤
NC(β, λ). Furthermore, NC(β, λ) > N b(β, λ).
Proof. See Online Appendix.
The intuition for this result is simple. The larger is λ, the higher is the incumbent’s
incentive to implement the spendthrift policy. On the other hand, from Proposition
7 we know that the politicians’ gain from implementing the politically optimal policy
decreases with n. Therefore, the combination of large values for both λ and n suﬃces to
rule (gC(0, β, λ, n), 0) out as an equilibrium outcome. Hence, for suﬃciently proﬂigate
parties, intense political competition unequivocally hinders the implementation of the
politically optimal policy.
Observe, however, that the payoﬀ of the representative household in the politically
optimal equilibrium is strictly increasing in n. Thus, when λ > λb1 and politicians seek
to implement that policy, household welfare would be maximized when n = NC(β, λ).
Still, if there were a ﬁxed cost F > 0 from coordinating on a policy, the maximum n
under which gC would be an equilibrium would be lower than NC(β, λ). And if such a
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Figure 2: The welfare impact of political competition; public debt, λ > max{λ, λb0, λb1}
cost increases with the number of parties–as would be plausible from a collective action
perspective–then the possibility of sustaining gC would be further reduced, as the gains
would decrease while the costs increase when political competition intensiﬁes.
We conclude this section with a synthesis of its results, which are summarized in
Figure 2 for λ > max{λ, λb0, λb1}. We study the strategic interactions of competing
political parties in a dynamic political game where the public debt links the incumbent’s
actions to the action space of future governments. If politicians are suﬃciently proﬂigate
(λ > λ), there is an equilibrium in which the date-0 incumbent sets current public
expenditures very high, pushing the public debt up to the point of immiserizing the
economy forever, in the sense of leaving welfare stuck at U(B¯, γ, B¯) for t ≥ 1. Adopting
that equilibrium as a benchmark, we use trigger strategies to characterize the feasibility
of other, welfare-superior outcomes. When political economy motives really matter
(λ > max{λb0, λ
b
1}), the eﬃcient policy can be implemented if there is some (n ≥ 2),
but not too much (n ≤ N b(β, λ)) political competition. A similar result applies for the
feasibility of the politically optimal policy, although it is feasible over a larger range of n
than the eﬃcient policy. By contrast, if political competition is very intense, neither the
eﬃcient nor the politically optimal policies are sustainable. As a result, the economy
becomes trapped in a bad equilibrium where welfare is U(B¯, γ, B¯) for t ≥ 1. Hence,
intense political competition can hurt aggregate welfare signiﬁcantly when governments
have easy access to public debt.
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4 Political competition and debt limits
We have found that intense political competition (a high n) encourages a political com-
promise when debt is forbidden but discourages it when debt is unrestricted. We now
show that there is a more general relationship between political competition, constraints
on debt issuing and economic eﬃciency. We do so by generalizing the model of section
3, so that those of sections 2 and 3 become special cases. Speciﬁcally, we let the public
debt be constrained by a legal ceiling BL. If BL = 0, we obtain the model without debt
of section 2; if BL = B¯, we have the model of section 3.
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We assume that the conditions that ensure that the spendthrift policy is an equi-
librium outcome are satisﬁed. One can then extend the reasoning used in section 3
to establish that, for any BL ∈ (0, B¯), the constrained spendthrift policy (i.e., the
spendthrift policy with BL replacing B¯) also is an equilibrium outcome. Deﬁning
∆UL ≡ U(0, g
∗(0, 0), 0) − U(BL, G(BL, BL, λ), BL) and ∆VL ≡ V (0, G(0, BL, λ), BL) −
V (0, g∗(0, 0), 0), it follows that the eﬃcient policy (g∗(0, 0), 0) is an equilibrium outcome
whenever the net gain from coordination (NGC ) is positive:27
NGC ≡
β
1− β

∆UL +
λ
n
(g∗(0, 0)−G(BL, BL, λ))

−∆VL ≥ 0. (36)
To study the conditions under which inequality (36) holds, deﬁne NL(β, λ,BL) anal-
ogously to N0(β, λ) and N b(β, λ):
NL(β, λ,BL) ≡
λ[g∗(0, 0)−G(BL, BL, λ)]
1−β
β
∆VL −∆UL
. (37)
Now recall that G(B¯, B¯, λ) = γ < g∗(0, 0) < gD = G(0, 0, λ). Since G(b, b, λ) is continu-
ous in b, an appeal to the intermediate value theorem establishes that there exists a debt
level Bˆ ∈ (0, B¯) with the property that G(Bˆ, Bˆ, λ) = g∗(0, 0). The fact that G(b, b, λ)
is strictly decreasing in b ensures that such a Bˆ is unique. We then have

BL > Bˆ ⇔ g
∗(0, 0)−G(BL, BL, λ) > 0
BL < Bˆ ⇔ g
∗(0, 0)−G(BL, BL, λ) < 0
BL = Bˆ ⇔ g
∗(0, 0)−G(BL, BL, λ) = 0.
Suppose ﬁrst that BL > Bˆ. It follows from the approach of section 3 that, if
β
1− β
∆UL ≥ ∆VL, (38)
26Observe that any BL > B¯ is immaterial, as the consequences of any legally deﬁned BL are limited
by the economic bound on the debt, B¯.
27For simplicity, we restrict the discussion here to the sustainability of the eﬃcient policy. Naturally,
the analysis could also be extended to the politically optimal policy.
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then (g∗(0, 0), 0) is a symmetric political outcome for any n. If instead
β
1− β
∆UL < ∆VL, (39)
then (g∗(0, 0), 0) is a symmetric political outcome if n ≤ NL(β, λ,BL).
Consider now that BL < Bˆ. We use the approach of section 2 to conclude that,
if [β/(1 − β)]∆UL ≤ ∆VL, then (g
∗(0, 0), 0) cannot be a symmetric political outcome.
Similarly, if [β/(1− β)]∆UL > ∆VL, then (g
∗(0, 0), 0) is a symmetric political outcome
provided that n ≥ NL(β, λ,BL).
Finally, if BL = Bˆ, the NGC does not depend on n and the eﬃcient policy is an
equilibrium outcome if (38) holds.
We can now study how a society can use BL to improve economic policy. A simple
example helps to ﬁx ideas. Consider a society in which N b(β, λ) = 4 and N0(β, λ) = 8.
Suppose that n = 3. Clearly, the eﬃcient policy is sustainable if the government can
issue debt without any legal constraint, but is not if debt issuing is forbidden. Now
consider that n = 10. The eﬃcient policy becomes feasible if BL = 0, but may not be
if debt is unrestricted. The example illustrates a more general principle: a debt ceiling
is deleterious whenever n ≤ min{N0(β, λ), N b(β, λ)}. On the other hand, a society
can achieve better economic outcomes by placing a legal constraint on debt issuing if
n ≥ max{N0(β, λ),N b(β, λ)}. In sum, the desirability of a legal debt limit hinges on
the existing level of political competition. More generally, we have the following result.
Proposition 9 The net gain from coordination (NGC) is submodular in the degree of
political competition (n) and the ceiling on the public debt (BL).
To see this result, it suﬃces to note that
∂2NGC
∂n∂BL
=
β
1− β
λ
n2
[Gb(BL, BL, λ) +Gb′(BL, BL, λ)] < 0.
It follows from the properties of submodular functions that the value of BL that max-
imizes NGC is decreasing in n. The intuition is as follows. A tighter BL lowers the
short-run gain from no-cooperation, independently of the degree of political competi-
tion. A stricter BL also inﬂuences the long-run gain from cooperation, aﬀecting the
payoﬀs of households and lowering the parties’ expected future rent gain.28 The former
is independent of n, but the lower future rent gain is more important, the less intense
is political competition. Thus, a tighter BL is more likely to undermine an otherwise
feasible political compromise when competition is limited. Conversely, a stricter BL is
28The future rent gain from cooperation falls from λ(g∗ − γ) when BL = B¯ to λ(g
∗ − gD) when
BL = 0, where λ(g
∗ − gD) < 0 < λ(g∗ − γ).
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more likely to support an otherwise unviable compromise, the more intense political
competition is.
At a more fundamental level, observe that a political compromise can both improve
economic outcomes and preserve oﬃce rents. The latter eﬀect can be critical to make
the compromise sustainable, and is present when constraints on the public debt are
lax. As preserving rents is more important when there is less political competition,
constraints on political competition can improve economic outcomes when the public
debt is relatively unconstrained. Conversely, a debt limit is advisable when political
competition is intense. Put simply, the feasibility of a political compromise tends to
require either a limit on political competition or a cap on the public debt.29
Figure 3 illustrates this result. It displays three curves: ∆VL and GCL ≡
β
1−β
[∆UL+
λ
n
(g∗(0, 0) − G(BL, BL, λ))] for n = nl and n = nh, nl < nh. Observe that ∆VL is
independent of n. The key to the ﬁgure is that, following Proposition 9, GCL is steeper
in BL, the lower n is. In the example of Figure 3, this implies that, under intense
political competition (n = nh), the eﬃcient policy is sustainable if the debt is suﬃciently
restricted (BL ≤ B1). In turn, under weak political competition (n = nl), the eﬃcient
policy is sustainable if the debt is left relatively unrestricted (BL ≥ B2). For moderate
levels of the debt ceiling (B1 < BL < B2), the policy g
∗ is feasible for neither nl nor nh.
Now, recall from Proposition 1 that, if λ is suﬃciently large (λ > λ0), g
∗ is infeasible
with BL = 0 regardless of n (in Figure 3, λ > λ0 would imply GCL(n) < ∆VL for any
n when BL = 0). In such a case, g
∗ may still be sustainable; it would be most likely
to be sustainable (in the sense of maximizing NGC ) when BL = B¯ and n = 2. That
is, when political frictions are severe, eﬃcient policies have the greatest chance of being
implemented in a bipartisan polity where the government has unrestricted access to the
public debt.
These ﬁndings help us to understand the relationship between political competition,
debt limits and economic outcomes from a theoretical perspective, but they also have
important implications for empirical research. Usually, measures of constraints on debt
issuing are not considered in analyses of the eﬀects of political competition, as in most
studies discussed in the Introduction. Similarly, measures of political competition do not
regularly enter analyses of the eﬀects of ﬁscal constraints (see Besley 2007). Our model
suggests that such omissions tend to bias the relationships in critical ways. In fact,
simply controlling for the omitted factor is not enough. Rather, our analysis stresses the
interaction between the two measures.
29It is important to stress that, although so far we have taken the level of political competition
as given, in reality it is of course endogenous to the country’s legislative and electoral rules. Morelli
(2004), for example, shows how diﬀerent electoral systems lead to diﬀerent equilibrium numbers of
political parties. Relatedly, Callander (2005) shows how splitting the vote in heterogeneous districts
aﬀects the equilibrium level of political competition and the resulting policies.
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Figure 3: The trade-oﬀ between political competition and debt limits
Speciﬁcally, consider a panel regression of the form
yit = α0 + αnnit +αXit + ǫit,
where yit is an economic outcome (such as GDP) or a proxy for the quality of economic
policy, nit measures political competition and Xit is a vector of controls. Our analysis
indicates that the estimated αn will be positive when the panel contains mostly cases
where the limit on debt issuing (BLit) is tight, but negative when the panel contains
mostly cases where BLit is lax. If the panel is relatively balanced between the two cases,
the estimated αn will tend to be statistically indistinguishable from zero. Observe that
including BLit in Xit would not ﬁx the problem. Instead, according to our analysis a
properly speciﬁed regression to study the eﬀects of nit on yit would be
yit = α0 + αnnit + αbBLit + αnbnitBLit +αXit + ǫ.
Our model establishes that αnb < 0 and indicates that the absence of the interaction
term can help to explain the conﬂicting empirical results obtained in the literature. A
similar point applies to empirical analyses of debt constraints on economic outcomes.
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5 Concluding remarks
We study how the degree of political competition aﬀects the feasibility of eﬃcient policies
in a majoritarian political system. We move from the usual emphasis in the literature, on
how competition allows voters to discipline politicians, to an environment where political
parties may discipline each other. We ﬁnd that, when the government faces tight limits
in its ability to ﬁnance its expenditures through debt, strong political competition can
facilitate equilibria where socially eﬃcient policies are implemented. The reason is that
intense political competition reduces the probability that each individual party will hold
power in the future. This lowers the value of future political rents, facilitating a compro-
mise that curbs discretionary spending. Yet the reverse is true when the government is
relatively free to ﬁnance its expenditures with debt. In that case, eﬃcient policies raise
future rents, by preventing equilibria where future governments are constrained to set
public expenditures at the minimal level, consistent with serving the maximum feasible
level of debt. As a result, intense political competition makes eﬃcient policies harder
to sustain. In particular, when politicians are very proﬂigate, eﬃcient policies can be
made feasible only under very limited political competition, and only without constraints
on the public debt. Overall, our analysis implies that legislation on the ability of the
government to issue debt needs to be established in conjunction with legislation that
curbs/promotes political competition.
It is worth emphasizing that the forces driving the desirability of a debt limit in our
analysis are not the ones usually emphasized in the literature. In general, a debt ceiling
can help by restricting how much rent incumbents can extract from future taxpayers.
But it is not necessarily helpful. First, a ceiling can prevent the debt from fulﬁlling its
tax smoothing purpose (Barro 1979); second, it may disturb the political equilibrium and
aggravate adverse selection problems (as in Besley and Smart 2007). Here neither of these
potential costs of debt limits is present, since the model is deterministic and all political
parties are assumed to be identical. Instead, society’s dilemma when considering a debt
ceiling is between avoiding losses due to incumbents’ short-run “irresponsibility” and
reducing the parties’ gain from (and therefore the likelihood of) a political compromise.
A limitation of our analysis is that we treat electoral probabilities as ﬁxed and iden-
tical across parties. The latter is unessential. For example, allowing for an exogenous
incumbency advantage, as e.g. in Aguiar and Amador (2011), would add another dimen-
sion but would not alter the essence of our analysis. Allowing policies to aﬀect reelection
prospects, on the other hand, would be signiﬁcantly more involving. In such a case, we
conjecture that the thrust of our results would remain unchanged provided that some
electoral uncertainty remains. A full analysis of such a case is, however, beyond the
scope of this paper.
Exploring the possibility of an intertemporal compromise among political parties,
our goal here is to highlight an important but overlooked mechanism that reveals how
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political competition and debt limits interact to shape economic policies. We uncover
a novel tradeoﬀ between political competition and debt limits that can guide empirical
analyses and may also inform policy recommendations. To our knowledge, this is the
ﬁrst normative result linking restraints on political participation and limits on the public
debt. Hopefully, future research will shed light on the robustness of this tradeoﬀ in more
general settings.
Appendix 1: the economy without debt
Basic structure and competitive equilibrium
Consider a society populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households with Lebesgue
measure one and a government. Each household is endowed with one unit of time.
A single competitive ﬁrm produces a single consumption good. Technology is de-
scribed by 0 ≤ c + g ≤ l, where l is the amount of time allocated to production, c
corresponds to household consumption, and g denotes government consumption. Feasi-
bility requires
ct + gt = lt, (40)
where t denotes time. Since lt ≤ 1, we conclude that gt ≤ 1.
At each date t a spot market for goods and labor services operates. The government
ﬁnances its expenditures by taxing labor income at a proportional tax τ t. Its budget
constraint is
gt = τ tlt. (41)
The twice diﬀerentiable function u = u(c, l, g) describes the typical household period
utility function. It is strictly increasing in c and g and strictly decreasing in l. For a
ﬁxed g, u satisﬁes standard monotonicity, quasi-concavity, and Inada conditions.
Intertemporal preferences are described by
∞
t=0
βtu(ct, lt, gt). (42)
A household’s date-t budget constraint is
ct ≤ (1− τ t)lt. (43)
Given {gt, τ t}
∞
t=0, at date t = 0 a household chooses a sequence {ct, lt}
∞
t=0 to maximize
(42) subject to (43) and lt ≤ 1.
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A competitive equilibrium for a ﬁscal policy {gt, τ t}
∞
t=0 is a sequence {ct, lt}
∞
t=0 that
satisﬁes (40) and solves the typical household’s problem. A sequence {gt}
∞
t=0 is attain-
able if there exist sequences {τ t}
∞
t=0 and {ct, lt}
∞
t=0 such that {ct, lt}
∞
t=0 is a competitive
equilibrium for {gt, τ t}
∞
t=0.
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We now characterize the set of attainable allocations and policies. The household’s
ﬁrst-order necessary and suﬃcient conditions are (43) taken as equality and
−
ul(ct, lt, gt)
uc(ct, lt, gt)
= 1− τ t, (44)
which is equivalent to
τ t = 1 +
ul(ct, lt, gt)
uc(ct, lt, gt)
. (45)
Combine this expression with (41) to conclude that any attainable outcome {ct, lt, gt}
∞
t=0
must satisfy
gt =

1 +
ul(ct, lt, gt)
uc(ct, lt, gt)

lt. (46)
We can then use techniques similar to those in Chari and Kehoe (1999) to show that a
sequence {ct, lt, gt}
∞
t=0 satisﬁes (40) and (46) if and only if it is attainable.
The function U(g)
At each date t, there are two ﬁscal variables (gt and τ t) that the government can select.
If the Laﬀer curve of this artiﬁcial economy is monotone, then the government can
actually select only one variable. If there are multiple tax rates that fund the same level
of government expenditures, for each attainable value of g we deﬁne U(g) according to
U(g) = max
(c,l)
u(c, l, g) (47)
subject to (40) and (46). Hence, whenever we say that a sequence {gt}
∞
t=0 is a policy, we
are assuming that τ t is given by the solution of (47) for the corresponding gt.
It should be clear that U resembles an indirect utility function. Built in that function
is a trade-oﬀ between increasing the provision of g and reducing the tax burden. Al-
though we assume that the government only has distortionary revenues, we could have
assumed that lump-sum taxes were available without aﬀecting the results.
The constraints l ≤ 1 and (40) imply that if g = 1, then c = 0 and l = 1. Thus,
the Inada conditions on u imply that U(1) ≤ U(g) for all g ≤ 1. Moreover, it may
be the case that U(1) = −∞. Furthermore, if u(c, l, 0) = −∞, then U(0) = −∞. As
30The players of the games considered in the paper are required to select attainable policies.
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indicated in section 2, if U is unbounded from below, then any policy {gt}
∞
t=0 can be
an equilibrium of our political game. To avoid such an indeterminacy, we assume that
there is a lower bound γ > 0 and an upper bound Γ < 1 for g so that gt ∈ [γ,Γ].
An inspection of problem (47) shows that the second derivative of U depends on
the third derivatives of u. Thus, unless extra assumptions are placed on u, one cannot
ensure that U is strictly concave, as we assume in section 2. But it is easy to provide
conventional examples in which U is indeed strictly concave. For one, let u(c, l, g) =
α1 ln c+ α2 ln(1− l) + α3 ln g, where α1, α2, and α3 are positive numbers. Then
U(g) = α1 ln[α1 − (α1 + α2)g] + α3 ln g + α2 ln

α2
(α1 + α2)α1

(48)
and
U ′′(g) = −

α1(α1 + α2)
[α1 − (α1 + α2)g]2
+
α3
g

< 0. (49)
Appendix 2: the economy with unrestricted debt
Basic structure and competitive equilibrium
Take as starting point the economy described above. We introduce debt on it by as-
suming that the government issues claims to one unit of the consumption good. These
claims are traded at a price qt. The government period budget constraint is
gt + bt = τ tlt + qtbt+1, (50)
where bt is the amount of claims to be redeemed at beginning of date t. Households’
equivalent constraint is
ct + qtbt+1 ≤ (1− τ t)lt + bt. (51)
The initial value of the public debt is exogenous and satisﬁes b0 = 0. To avoid Ponzi
schemes, the public debt must satisfy the constraints |bt+1| ≤M <∞, where M <∞ is
large enough so that these constraints never bind. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions
of the household problem are (51) taken as equality plus (44),
β
uc(ct+1, lt+1, gt+1)
uc(ct, lt, gt)
= qt, (52)
and
lim
t→∞
βtuc(ct+1, lt+1, gt+1)bt+1 = 0. (53)
A competitive equilibrium for a ﬁscal policy {gt, τ t}
∞
t=0 is composed by sequences
{ct, lt}
∞
t=0, {bt+1}
∞
t=0 and {qt+1}
∞
t=0 that satisfy (40) and the optimal behavior by the
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households. A sequence {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=0 is attainable if there exist sequences {τ t}
∞
t=0, {ct, lt}
∞
t=0
and {qt+1}
∞
t=0 such that {ct, lt}
∞
t=0, {bt+1}
∞
t=0 and {qt+1}
∞
t=0 constitute a competitive equi-
librium for {gt, τ t}
∞
t=0.
Let H(c, l, g) ≡ uc(c, l, g)c + ul(c, l, g)l. Using the reasoning of Chari and Kehoe
(1999), we have that the set of attainable sequences is fully characterized by (40) and
∞
t=0
βtH(ct, lt, gt) = 0. (54)
Additionally, the public debt sequence must satisfy
∞
t=s
βt−sH(ct, lt, gt) = uc(cs, ls, gs)bs. (55)
The eﬃcient and the dictatorial policies
The eﬃcient allocation {c∗t , l
∗
t , g
∗
t }
∞
t=0 solves the problem of maximizing households’ life-
time utility (42) subject to (40) and (54). The solution is characterized by those con-
straints plus the ﬁrst-order conditions

uc(ct, lt, gt)− θt +ΘHc(ct, lt, gt) = 0
ul(ct, lt, gt) + θt +ΘHl(ct, lt, gt) = 0
ug(ct, lt, gt)− θt +ΘHg(ct, lt, gt) = 0,
(56)
where θt and Θ are, respectively, Lagrange multipliers for (40) and (54), while Hc, Hl
and Hg are partial derivatives.
Equations (56), together with (40), establish that {c∗t , l
∗
t , g
∗
t }
∞
t=0 is a static sequence.
Thus,
∞
t=s β
t−sH(c∗t , l
∗
t , g
∗
t ) =
∞
t=0 β
tH(c∗t , l
∗
t , g
∗
t ) = 0 for all s. Hence, (55) implies
that b∗s = 0 for every s.
Finally, observe that if b0 = 0, it would be necessary to add uc(c0, l0, g0)b0 to the
right-hand side of (54). As a consequence, the date-0 ﬁrst-order conditions would be
slightly diﬀerent and the eﬃcient allocation would then be static only for t ≥ 1. The
public debt would be constant for t ≥ 1. However, it would not be equal to the initial
exogenous value b0. In synthesis, if b0 = 0, the eﬃcient allocations and the debt levels
would change from t = 0 to t = 1 and then reach a steady state.
The characterization of the dictatorial policy {gDt , b
D
t+1}
∞
t=0 requires ﬁnding a sequence
{cDt , l
D
t , g
D
t }
∞
t=0 that maximizes
∞
t=0 β
t[u(ct, lt, gt) + λgt] subject to (40) and (54). The
solution is given by the same equations as the eﬃcient policy except that
ug(ct, lt, gt) + λ− θt +ΘHg(ct, lt, gt) = 0
replaces the third equation in (56). Thus, bDt+1 = 0 for all t and the sequence {g
D
t }
∞
t=0 is
static.
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The function U(b, g, b′)
As pointed out in Section 3, the function U(b, g, b′) is either a perfect representation or
a steady-state approximation of the typical household period payoﬀ. In the former case,
the approximation is accurate to the point of perfectly matching the household utility
in each of the equilibria studied in the paper.
Take an array [b0, {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=0]. Deﬁne U (b0, {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=0) according to
U (b0, {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=0) ≡ max
{ct,lt}∞t=0
∞
t=0
βtu(ct, lt, gt) (57)
subject to (40), (53), and
ct + β
uc(ct+1, lt+1, gt+1)
uc(ct, lt, gt)
bt+1 = −
ul(ct, lt, gt)
uc(ct, lt, gt)
lt + bt.
This last expression was obtained by combining the equality version of (51) with (44)
and (52). By construction, U (b0, {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=0) is the highest lifetime utility that the
household can attain if the government implements the policy {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=0.
If there is a functionW(b, g, b′) satisfying
∞
t=0 β
tW(bt, gt, bt+1) = U (b0, {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=0),
then we simply set U =W. Clearly, U will be a perfect measurement of the household
period payoﬀ. If U cannot be decomposed in that way, then we proceed as follows.
Let {g, b′} denote a policy {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=0 in which (gt, bt+1) = (g, b
′) for every t. Now
take a generic vector (b, g, b′). If each of the arrays [b, {g, b′}] and [b′, {g, b′}] is attainable,
then deﬁne U (b, g, b′) so that
U (b, g, b′) ≡ U (b, {g, b′})− βU (b′, {g, b′}) . (58)
Observe that U (b, {g, b′}) is the household lifetime payoﬀ when the economy starts with
debt b and reaches the steady-state (g, b′) after a single period, while U (b′, {g, b′}) is the
lifetime payoﬀ in such a steady state. Hence, we deﬁne U (b, g, b′) in such a way that it
captures the household utility gain (or loss) associated with that one-period transition.
If [b, {g, b′}] or [b′, {g, b′}] is not attainable, then we need to modify our deﬁnition.
In that case, we set U according to
U (b, g, b′) = U (b, [(g˜(b, b′), b′), {gˆ(b′), b′}])− βU (b′, {gˆ(b′), b′}) , (59)
where gˆ(b′) is the maximum attainable value for g in a steady state with debt b′, g˜(b, b′) is
the maximum attainable value for g0 when the initial debt is b and the economy will be in
state (gˆ(b′), b′) for every t ≥ 1, and [(g˜(b, b′), b′), {gˆ(b′), b′}] denotes the policy {gt, bt+1}
∞
t=0
in which (g0, b1) = (g˜(b, b
′), b′) and (gt, bt+1) = (gˆ(b
′), b′) for every t ≥ 1. Observe that we
replaced the values of g speciﬁed in the arrays [b, {g, b′}] and [b′, {g, b′}] by the highest
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attainable values for that variable. Implicit in our deﬁnition is the assumption that b
and b′ are attainable values for the public debt.
It remains to show that the proposed U will lead to a perfect measurement of the
household’s lifetime utility under the the eﬃcient, the politically optimal, and the spend-
thrift policies (the three equilibrium outcomes discussed in the paper). Let (g, b) be any
attainable steady state. We use (58) to conclude that
U (b, g, b) = U (b, {g, b})− βU (b, {g, b})⇒
U (b, g, b) = (1− β)U (b, {g, b})⇒∞
t=0
βtU (b, g, b) = U (b, {g, b}) .
Therefore, we have a perfect measurement of the household’s lifetime utility in any steady
state. Since both the eﬃcient and politically optimal policies are static, U properly
measures their corresponding payoﬀs.
Finally, denote the household payoﬀ under the spendthrift policy by X. Thus,
X = U
	
b0, G(b0, B¯, λ), B¯


+
β
1− β
U
	
B¯, γ, B¯


.
The value of U
	
B¯, γ, B¯


is given by (58), while U
	
b0, G(b0, B¯, λ), B¯


follows (59). Hence,
X = U
	
b0, [(g˜(b0, B¯), B¯), {γ, B¯}]


− βU
	
B¯, {γ, B¯}


+
β
1− β
(1− β)U
	
B¯, {γ, B¯}


⇒
X = U
	
b0, [(g˜(b0, B¯), B¯), {γ, B¯}]


.
From Lemma 3 in the Online Appendix, G(b0, B¯, λ) is equal to the maximum attainable
value for g0 when λ is large. Hence, G(b0, B¯, λ) = g˜(b0, B¯). Therefore,
X = U
	
b0, [(G(b0, B¯, λ), B¯), {γ, B¯}]


,
as we wanted to show.
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